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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
In an issue of first impression, the district court held that the arrest standards 
under Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho State Constitution are not coextensive with those 
of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and, determining that those 
higher standards had not been met, granted Alesha Ann Green's suppression motion. 
The state appeals from the district court's order granting that motion. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
As set forth by the district court, the factual background of this case is as follows: 
On the evening of October 2, 2012, Ada County Sheriff's Office 
Deputy Joe Richardson stopped Defendant for failing to maintain her lane 
of travel. Defendant admitted she knew her driver's license was invalid, 
and Deputy Richardson arrested her for driving on an invalid license. 
Deputy Richardson had no reason to believe that Defendant was 
someone other than who she claimed to be, nor did he have any reason to 
believe that Defendant would not appear for court. 
Defendant was searched incident to arrest and alleged drugs and 
drug paraphernalia were found. Her car was also searched and $6,500 in 
cash was discovered. Defendant was transported immediately to the Ada 
County Jail to be interviewed by detectives. She made incriminating 
statements. Defendant gave consent to search her hotel room, where a 
digital scale and plastic baggies were discovered. 
(R., p.318.) 
Green filed a motion to suppress the drug evidence and statements she made 
after her arrest. (R., pp.112-15.) The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the 
motion. (R., p.316.) Following that hearing, the district court granted Green's motion, 
holding that because her arrest did not comply with Idaho Code§ 49-1407, her seizure 
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was unconstitutional. (R., pp.317-27.) The state filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., 
pp.334-36.) 
2 
ISSUE 
This case raises an issue of first impression. In Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 
(2008), the United States Supreme Court determined that the arrest standard under the 
Fourth Amendment was probable cause, independent of state law. While recognizing 
this, the district court determined that the reasonableness of an arrest under Article I, 
Section 17 of the Idaho State Constitution depended on strict adherence to state 
statutes. Did the district court err when it decided that the Idaho State Constitution 
should be interpreted differently than the United States Constitution? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred By Suppressing The Evidence Discovered Incident To Green's 
Constitutionally Reasonable Arrest 
A. Introduction 
Officers arrested Green on probable cause that she was violating Idaho state law 
by driving on an invalid license. (R., p.318.) Idaho Code§ 49-1407, however, only 
allows officers to write a citation for a person driving on an invalid license, unless there 
is reason to believe that the person is using a false identity or that the person will not 
later answer the summons in court. I.C. § 49-1407(1). Incident to Green's arrest she 
was searched, and that search led to the discovery of drugs and other evidence. 
Green filed a motion to suppress the drug evidence and statements she made 
after her arrest, asserting that her arrest was unlawful. (R., pp.112-15.) Though it 
recognized that the reasonableness of an arrest for purposes of the Fourth Amendment 
does not depend on state law, the district court still determined that the arrest was 
unreasonable under Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho State Constitution because it did 
not comply with Idaho Code § 49-1407 and granted the motion. (R., pp.320-27.) 
Application of the correct legal standards, however, shows no basis for interpreting the 
Idaho State Constitution differently than the United States Constitution in regards to the 
standards for a reasonable arrest. Because the search and seizure were reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment, they are reasonable under Article I, Section 17, and the 
district court's order suppressing evidence should be reversed. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
"Both constitutional questions and questions of statutory interpretation are 
questions of law over which this Court exercises free review." Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho 
35, 40,232 P.3d 813,818 (2010) (citation omitted). 
C. There Is No Basis To Interpret Article I, Section 17 Of The Idaho State 
Constitution Differently Than The Fourth Amendment Of The United States 
Constitution In Regards To The Constitutional Standard For Arrests 
Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 17 of the Idaho State Constitution protect the people against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. Whether an arrest is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment 
is controlled by the United State Supreme Court's recent opinion in Virginia v. Moore, 
553 U.S. 164 (2008). In Moore, police officers stopped a car driven by Moore and 
arrested him for driving on a suspended license. kt at 166. In a search incident to that 
arrest the officers found drugs. kt at 166-167. Moore moved to suppress the evidence 
resulting from the search by claiming that, under Virginia law, the offense for which he 
was arrested was only citable, and therefore the arrest was unlawful. kt at 167-168. 
The Virginia Supreme Court reversed Moore's conviction, reasoning that Moore's arrest 
was unlawful under state law, and therefore the search incident to arrest was invalid 
under the Fourth Amendment. kt at 168. 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case and reversed the 
Virginia court. The Supreme Court explained that its Fourth Amendment precedent 
made clear that an arrest based on probable cause was constitutionally reasonable, and 
state law regarding searches and seizures did not change that calculus. kt at 171-172. 
The Supreme Court reasoned: 
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The Fourth Amendment protects against "unreasonable searches 
and seizures" of (among other things) the person. In determining whether 
a search or seizure is unreasonable, we begin with history. We look to 
statutes and common law of the founding era to determine the norms that 
the Fourth Amendment was meant to preserve. 
We are aware of no historical indication that those who ratified the 
Fourth Amendment understood it as a redundant guarantee of whatever 
limits on search and seizure legislatures might have enacted. The 
immediate object of the Fourth Amendment was to prohibit the general 
warrants and writs of assistance that English judges had employed 
against the colonists. That suggests, if anything, that founding-era 
citizens were skeptical of using the rules for search and seizure set by 
government actors as the index of reasonableness. 
rvloore, 553 U.S. at 168 (citations and footnote omitted). Further analyzing the question, 
the Supreme Court ultimately concluded "that warrantless arrests for crimes committed 
in the presenc0 N ,:,.-- ="~-c-.•. ;; ,.,cer are reasonable under the Constitution, and that 
while states are free to regulate such arrests however they desire, state restrictions do 
not alter the Fourth Amendment's protections." 1sL at 176. Having found the arrest 
lawful under the Constitutional standards for arrest, the Court also rejected the 
argument that the search incident to arrest was unreasonable because the arrest was 
"unlawful" under state law. 1sL at 177-178. 
Because the Fourth Amendment analysis is controlled by the United States 
Supreme Court opinion in Moore, the question becomes whether the analysis under the 
Idaho State Constitution should be any different. The Idaho Supreme Court recently 
held that, "when interpreting the Idaho Constitution, this Court will use federal rules and 
methodology unless clear precedent or circumstances unique to the state of Idaho or its 
constitution indicates that Idaho's constitution provides greater protection than the 
analogous federal provision." CDA Dairy Queen, Inc. v. State Insurance Fund, 154 
Idaho 379, 384, 299 P.3d 186, 191 (2013). The district court nevertheless determined 
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that the Idaho State Constitution should be interpreted differently than the United States 
Constitution under these circumstances and, though constitutional under Moore, held 
that Green's arrest was unreasonable under Article I, Section 17 because it did not 
strictly comply with state statute. (R., pp.320-23.) 
It is well-established that Idaho courts are "free to interpret our state constitution 
as more protective of the rights of Idaho citizens than the United States Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the federal constitution." State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 987, 
842 P.2d 660, 666 (1992) (citations omitted). However, in those cases where the Idaho 
Supreme Court has determined that our constitution provides greater protections than 
the federal constitution, the Court explains the reasons why. See State v. Fees, 140 
Idaho 81, 88-89, 90 P.3d 306, 313-314 (2004) (discussing cases and noting that, in 
those cases, the Court "provided greater protection to Idaho citizens based on the 
uniqueness of our state, our Constitution, and our long-standing jurisprudence"); State 
v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 472, 20 P.3d 5, 8 (2001) (same); cf. State v. Wheaton, 121 
Idaho 404, 406-407, 825 P.2d 501, 503-504 (1992) (declining to consider claim that 
Idaho State Constitution affords greater protection absent supporting argument). The 
district court, however, failed to provide any basis for interpreting Article I, Section 17 of 
the Idaho State Constitution differently than the Fourth Amendment in regards to what 
constitutes a reasonable basis for arrest. (See R., pp. 317-27.) Correctly applying the 
relevant legal standards, there is no basis for interpreting the Idaho State Constitution 
more broadly than its federal counterpart in this circumstance. 
There is no evidence that Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho State Constitution is 
not coextensive with the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution in regards 
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to the standards for a reasonable arrest. First, Idaho's uniqueness, often expressed in 
the context of expectations of privacy held by people living in a rural state, does not 
have the same significance with respect to whether an arrest must strictly comply with 
statute or need simply be supported by probable cause. Cf. State v. Webb, 130 Idaho 
462, 467, 943 P.2d 52, 57 (1997) (in determining the extent of curtilage, the Court 
should consider the "locality of the residence" and "the differences in custom and 
terrain" when resolving reasonable expectations of privacy). Second, the language of 
the search and seizure provisions of the Idaho State Constitution is practically identical 
to the language employed by the framers of the Fourth Amendment. 1 Finally, no "long-
standing" jurisprudence clearly suggests that the Idaho State Constitution requires a 
different basis for arrest than the basis which satisfies the Fourth Amendment, i.e., 
probable cause. 
This Court has recognized that there is "merit in having the same rule of law 
applicable within the borders of our state, whether an interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment or its counterpart-Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution-is involved. 
1 Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho State Constitution reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not 
be violated; and no warrant shall issue without probable cause shown by 
affidavit, particularly describing the place to be searched and the person 
or thing to be seized. 
Similarly, the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
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Such consistency makes sense to the police and the public." State v. Charpentier, 131 
Idaho 649, 653, 962 P.2d 1033, 1037 (1998). Although the "Court has at times 
construed the provisions of our Constitution to grant greater protection than that 
afforded under the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal 
Constitution," the circumstances in which the Court has done so do not "support a 
divergence from the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment by the United States 
Supreme Court in this case." Fees, 140 Idaho at 88-89, 90 P.3d 313-314. 
Though not directly addressed by the district court, the state acknowledges 
statements from prior decisions that "[w]hether or not an arrest was legal is governed by 
state law." State v. Julian, 129 Idaho 133, 135, 922 P.2d 1059, 1062 (1996) (citing 
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 420-21 n.8 (1976); State v. Pontier, 95 Idaho 
707, 712, 518 P.2d 969, 974 (1974)). The "legality" of an arrest, however, has no 
bearing on the constitutionality of the arrest. As explained by the United States 
Supreme Court in Moore, no precedent holds that "violations of state arrest law are also 
violations of the Fourth Amendment," rather, "when States go above the Fourth 
Amendment minimum, the Constitution's protections concerning search and seizure 
remain the same." kl at 173; see also kl at 177 (distinguishing the usage of "lawful" in 
state-court decisions as shorthand for compliant with state law from prior Supreme 
Court usage of "lawful" as shorthand for compliant with constitutional constraints). 
The Supreme Court recognized in Moore that if it "concluded otherwise, we 
would often frustrate rather than further state policy." kl at 174. As the Supreme Court 
explained, while Virginia chose to enact by statute more stringent arrest standards than 
those required by the Constitution, it did not attach the remedy of exclusion of evidence 
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to violations of those statutes. 1st To force the exclusionary rule onto the states for 
mere statutory violations could have the result of states altogether abandoning 
restrictions on arrest in order to maintain control over the remedy. 1st That same 
rationale holds true in Idaho. Idaho courts should not impose constitutional remedies 
for statutory violations, but should allow the Idaho legislature to determine the remedy 
for violations of its statutes. 
Because the standard for a constitutionally reasonable arrest is probable cause 
that the defendant is violating the law, and officers had probable cause to believe Green 
was violating the law by driving on an invalid license, Green's arrest was reasonable. 
Because Green's arrest did not violate either her state or federal constitutional rights, 
there is no basis on which to suppress the evidence discovered incident to that arrest. 
The district court erred by suppressing the evidence in this case and its order should be 
reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
granting Green's suppression motion, and remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 3rd day of June, 2014. 
Deputy Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 3rd day of June, 2014, served a true and 
correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy addressed 
to: 
SARA B. THOMAS 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
CR~ER 
Deputy Attorney General 
RJS/pm 
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